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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-1286 
____________                                                     
 
MOHAMMED HUSSEIN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UPMC MERCY HOSPITAL 
 ___________                       
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cv-00547) 
District Judge: Honorable Terrence F. McVerry 
___________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1 
February 10, 2012 
 
Before:    SLOVITER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, District Judge
*
 
 
(Filed: February 24, 2012 ) 
___________                      
 
OPINION OF THE COURT           
___________ 
 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
*
The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior District Judge for the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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 Mohammed Hussein appeals the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment in 
favor of UPMC Mercy Hospital (the “Hospital”) on his retaliation claims under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (the “PHRA”), 43 Pa. Const. Stat. § 951 et seq.  We 
agree with the District Court that the Hospital is entitled to summary judgment and will 
affirm. 
 I.  
We write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history of this case.  Accordingly, we set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis.   
 The Hospital hired Hussein as a nuclear medicine technologist in 1976.  His job 
responsibilities included performing diagnostic tests and completing medical 
documentation for Hospital patients.  His direct supervisor was Amy Dietz, the lead 
nuclear medicine technologist, who reported to Becky Volk, the Radiology Department 
director. 
 Hussein was a practicing Muslim, and learned in June 2006 of an opportunity to 
attend a group pilgrimage to Mecca from December 2006 to January 2007.  The Hospital 
had a seniority system for allocating vacation time and required employees to submit 
vacation requests for December by the preceding February.  Because Hussein did not 
learn of the opportunity to travel to Mecca until well after February, he submitted a late 
vacation request in June 2006.  Volk denied the request, stating that another technologist 
had already requested vacation time on the same dates.  In October 2006, Hussein told 
Sister Patricia Hespelein, a vice president at the Hospital, that Volk had violated his 
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“religious rights” by denying his vacation request, and asked for assistance in obtaining 
permission to attend a pilgrimage in December of 2007.  (A. 231.)   
Hussein then submitted a new vacation request in January 2007, requesting leave 
to participate in the December 2007 pilgrimage.  Although Hussein‟s second vacation 
request was timely, he submitted it outside of the Hospital‟s seniority-based system for 
allocating vacation time.  Volk denied the request on the grounds that Hussein had failed 
to follow the Hospital‟s policy for submitting vacation requests.  
Hussein testified that Hespelein, acting on Hussein‟s October 2006 complaint, 
informed him that she spoke with Volk in February 2007 and obtained permission for 
him to attend the December 2007 pilgrimage.
1
  In April 2007, Hussein claims that Volk 
“showed her displeasure” for his report to Hespelein by calling him into her office 
concerning an unrelated matter and asking him to explain why he spoke with Hespelein 
about the vacation requests.  (A. 234.)  Hussein also claims that Volk “just was plain[,] 
short, [and] cold [in] demeanor to [him],” and “became more hostile” to him after his 
report to Hespelein.  (A. 234-35.)  According to an affidavit by Amy Helfrich, a former 
employee at the Hospital, “Becky Volk told [her] that [she] should „document‟ anything 
[she] saw that Mr. Hussein did wrong” and “made it clear . . . that she wanted Mr. 
Hussein out of the department.”  (A. 249.) 
One year later, in April 2008, Hussein engaged in two acts of purported 
misconduct that the Hospital investigated, culminating in his termination on April 24, 
                                              
1
 Hussein did participate in a pilgrimage at the end of December 2007. 
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2008.
2
  Amy Dietz, Hussein‟s direct supervisor, testified that she began investigating 
Hussein‟s alleged misconduct after a doctor informed her on April 14, 2008 that Hussein 
failed to notify a Hospital physician, Dr. Schultheis, about missing images in a renal scan 
on April 12, 2008.  Dietz testified that Hussein‟s alleged failure to notify the physician of 
the missing images was an infraction because the patient “could have had some serious 
medical issues with her care had they gone off of what [Hussein] had done.”  (A. 269.) 
According to Hussein, he realized while he was conducting the renal scan that the 
machine was malfunctioning and that several images were missing, so he immediately 
informed Dr. Schultheis about both the malfunction and the missing images.  Dr. 
Schultheis submitted an affidavit, attesting that Hussein notified him that he had 
“technical problems” during the scan.  (A. 264.)  According to Dietz‟s notes, however, 
Dr. Schultheis agreed that Hussein notified him of “camera issues,” but did not notify 
him of the missing images.  (A. 192.)   
On the same day that Dietz learned about Hussein‟s alleged failure to report the 
missing images, Sharon Boros, another technologist in Hussein‟s department, reported to 
Dietz that Hussein had placed her initials on a record for a blank scan on April 3, 2008.  
According to Dietz, placing another employee‟s name on a scan record violated Hospital 
policy because it attributed responsibility for the scan to that employee.  She further 
testified that she interpreted Boros‟s complaint as indicating that Hussein was placing 
multiple initials on scan records to avoid full responsibility for potential mistakes.    
                                              
2
 The Hospital initially claimed in Hussein‟s termination letter that he engaged in 
three acts of misconduct, but the Hospital now claims on appeal that Hussein committed 
only two acts of misconduct.  
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Hussein claims that he did not know how to perform the blank scan, so Boros 
helped him to prepare for it.  Around the time that the camera began scanning, Boros left, 
and Hussein completed the scan.  Afterwards, Hussein placed both his initials and 
Boros‟s initials in the Hospital record, because it was common practice in the Radiology 
Department to give credit to an employee who assisted in conducting a scan by placing 
that employee‟s initials in the record.   
Dietz testified that she began her investigation of Hussein‟s alleged misconduct by 
speaking with Dr. Schultheis and Hussein about the April 12, 2008 incident.  She then 
reported her findings about both the April 3, 2008 and April 12, 2008 incidents to Volk, 
who responded that she “had a history” with Hussein, and instructed Dietz to “talk to 
[Human Resources], and [to] please do all of it with [department manager] Lisa 
[Haskins].”  (A. 266.)  Dietz understood Volk‟s response as meaning that Volk “didn‟t 
want to be involved” in the investigation, and therefore proceeded by speaking with 
Haskins and with Human Resources.  (A. 266.)   
Haskins knew that Hussein had complained to Hespelein about Volk at some 
point, but likewise testified that Dietz indicated that Volk “had a prior issue” with 
Hussein, “and [that] [Volk] want[ed] to stay out of it, so [that the investigation] could be 
objective.”  (A. 253.)  Haskins further testified that she instructed Dietz to conduct a full 
investigation, and then she and Dietz consulted with Human Resources.  Neither Haskins 
nor Dietz testified that Volk directed the investigation or recommended Hussein‟s 
dismissal. 
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Hussein testified in his deposition that he believed Volk was on a leave of absence 
during the investigation and that Haskins was “[t]aking [Volk‟s] place.”  (A. 117.)  He 
also testified that he believed that Volk was involved in the investigation because he 
assumed, without knowing, that Haskins spoke with Volk before terminating him, and 
because Haskins copied Volk on the termination letter.   
After Hussein‟s termination, he sued the Hospital under Title VII; the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; and the PHRA.  His 
Title VII and PHRA claims alleged both discrimination and retaliation.  The parties filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment, and the District Court granted summary judgment 
to the Hospital on each of Hussein‟s claims. 
In granting summary judgment on Hussein‟s retaliation claims, the District Court 
reasoned that Hussein “failed to adduce any evidence from which a reasonable factfinder 
could find that [the Hospital‟s] real reason for terminating Plaintiff‟s employment was 
discriminatory animus.”  Hussein v. UPMC Mercy Hosp., No. 2:09-cv-00547, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 396, at *32 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2011) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 146-47 (2000)).  The District Court noted that “Volk, the person 
with alleged retaliatory motives, did not participate in either the internal investigation 
into his instances of misconduct or in the decision to terminate his employment,” and that 
Hussein “is unaware whether Sister Hespelein ever communicated his complaints to 
Volk.”  Id. at *33-34.  Hussein now appeals the District Court‟s decision only as to his 
retaliation claims. 
II. 
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 The District Court had jurisdiction over Hussein‟s Title VII claim under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 and had supplemental jurisdiction over Hussein‟s PHRA claim under 28 U.S.C. § 
1367.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review over district court decisions granting summary judgment.  See Farrell v. Planters 
Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).  Summary judgment is appropriate 
when the movant demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).   
A. 
 Hussein asserts that the District Court erred in holding that he fails to show 
evidence of retaliation.  His theory is that Volk harbored retaliatory animus against him 
because he reported her vacation request denials to Hespelein.  Although he 
acknowledges that Dietz and Haskins, rather than Volk, conducted the investigation that 
led to his termination, he posits that the investigation was “at the direction of Becky 
Volk.”  (Appellant‟s Br. 13.)  The Hospital counters that Hussein fails to establish a 
prima facie case of retaliation, because he does not present any evidence linking Volk‟s 
alleged retaliatory animus to Hussein‟s termination.  Alternatively, the Hospital argues 
that Hussein‟s two acts of alleged misconduct were legitimate reasons for his termination, 
and that Hussein does not present sufficient evidence to discredit these reasons. 
Title VII‟s anti-retaliation provision forbids an employer from “discriminat[ing]  
against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, 
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title 
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VII].”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).  The PHRA, which we generally interpret consistently 
with Title VII, likewise forbids employers from retaliating against employees for 
asserting their rights under the PHRA.
3
  See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., 283 F.3d 561, 
567 (3d Cir. 2002) (“The language of the PHRA is . . . substantially similar to [Title VII 
and other federal] anti-retaliation provisions, and we have held that the PHRA is to be 
interpreted as identical to federal anti-discrimination laws except where there is 
something specifically different . . . .”) (citing Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 552 (3d 
Cir. 1996)). 
 To assert a prima facie Title VII retaliation claim, the employee must show that 
“(1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse 
employment action against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between her 
participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”  Moore v. City 
of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Nelson v. Upsala Coll., 51 F.3d 
383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995)).  If the employee establishes his or her prima facie claim, “the 
familiar McDonnell Douglas approach applies[,] in which „the burden shifts to the 
employer to advance a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason‟ for its conduct.”  Id. at 342 
(quoting Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997)).  If the employer 
provides such a reason, the burden shifts back to the employee to show “that the 
                                              
3
 The PHRA‟s anti-retaliation provision forbids employers from “discriminat[ing] 
in any manner against any individual because such individual has opposed any practice 
forbidden by this act, or because such individual has made a charge, testified or assisted, 
in any manner, in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under this act.”  43 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 955(d). 
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employer‟s proffered explanation was false, and that retaliation was the real reason for 
the adverse employment action.”  Id. (quoting Krouse, 126 F.3d at 501).  
B. 
 We agree with the Hospital that Hussein fails to establish a prima facie retaliation 
claim because he does not show a causal connection between Volk‟s alleged retaliatory 
animus and the Hospital‟s termination decision.  In deciding whether the plaintiff has 
shown causation, we “have tended to focus on two factors: (1) the „temporal proximity‟ 
between the protected activity and the alleged discrimination and (2) the existence of „a 
pattern of antagonism in the intervening period.‟”  Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 450 
(3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 288 
(3d Cir. 2001)) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), abrogated in part on 
other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).  
Additionally, we may consider whether the record “as a whole” suggests retaliation.  
Kachmar v. Sungard Data Sys., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997).   
 Hussein appears to argue that the record as a whole suggests retaliation, noting 
that Volk specifically noted her displeasure in April, 2007 with his earlier report to 
Hespelein, that she treated him less favorably after his report, and that she indicated to 
Helfrich “that she wanted Mr. Hussein out of the department.”4  (A. 249.)  Hussein 
                                              
4
 Hussein does not argue that the temporal proximity between his complaint to 
Hespelein and his termination raises an inference of retaliation, presumably because well 
over a year passed between his complaint and his termination.  See, e.g., LeBoon v. 
Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 233 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[A] gap of three 
months between the protected activity and the adverse action, without more, cannot 
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provides little explanation, however, for how Volk‟s alleged retaliatory animus infected 
the Hospital‟s termination decision, speculating only that the investigation operated under 
Volk‟s direction.   
The record does not support Hussein‟s theory.  To the contrary, Hussein admitted 
in his deposition that he has no actual knowledge that Volk was involved in his 
termination, instead testifying that he believed that Volk was on a leave of absence 
during the investigation and termination decision.
5
  While Dietz and Haskins did not 
suggest that Volk was on a leave of absence, they both indicated that they believed that 
Volk was not participating in the investigation to avoid imparting bias.  Although Dietz 
spoke with Volk before initiating a full investigation, Hussein presents no evidence that 
Volk was behind the investigation or that she encouraged his termination. 
Hussein‟s argument is similar to the plaintiff‟s argument in Weston v. 
Pennsylvania, in which Weston contended that his employer retaliated against him by 
suspending him after he complained of sexual harassment to his supervisor.  See 251 F.3d 
420, 424 (3d Cir. 2001), abrogated in part on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe 
Ry. Co., 548 U.S. 53.  Although Weston‟s supervisor may have harbored retaliatory 
animus and “did play a role in the suspensions,” a panel of three impartial hearing 
officers “ultimately decided” to issue the suspensions.  Id. at 433.  We concluded that 
                                                                                                                                                  
create an inference of causation and defeat summary judgment.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 
5
 The only direct evidence of Volk‟s involvement to which Hussein points is 
Haskins‟s decision to copy Volk on his termination letter.  We do not agree, however, 
that this shows that Volk was involved in the termination decision.   
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Weston failed to show causation, in part because the hearing officers who made the 
suspension decisions had no retaliatory animus.  Id.; see also Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 
198 F.3d 403, 415 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff failed to show retaliation 
where there was no evidence that the employees who disciplined him knew of his 
protected activity). 
As in Weston, Hussein asserts that a supervisory employee harbored retaliatory 
animus against him, but fails to show that the decisionmakers responsible for his 
termination held any retaliatory animus.  Instead, he speculates that Dietz and Haskins 
may have acted under Volk‟s direction, but he offers no factual support for his assertion.  
Accordingly, as in Weston, Hussein has failed to present sufficient facts to raise an 
inference of a causal relationship between his protected activity and his termination.  
Because causation is a necessary element of Hussein‟s prima facie case, the Hospital is 
entitled to summary judgment.
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III.  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment. 
 
 
                                              
6
 Because we hold that Hussein has failed to establish a prima facie case of 
retaliation, we do not address the parties‟ remaining dispute over whether the Hospital‟s 
proffered reasons for Hussein‟s termination were pretextual.   
